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Who Will Be Liable for Medical Malpractice in the 
Future? How the Use of Artificial Intelligence in 
Medicine Will Shape Medical Tort Law 
 
Scott J. Schweikart 
 
ABSTRACT 
Artificial intelligence (AI) is a powerful technology that can 
assist physicians with the practice of medicine. Use of the tech-
nology has grown in recent years and has powerful potential. 
Medical AI typically functions as a type of “machine-learning” 
that relies on deep neural networks to sift through vast amounts 
of data to give recommendations or draw conclusions for clini-
cians. This Article begins by outlining key characteristics of med-
ical AI (e.g., AI’s opacity and “black-box,” and how and with what 
data the AI was developed) that make assessment of liability un-
der traditional tort paradigms (like negligence) difficult. This Ar-
ticle then highlights several tort paradigms (e.g., medical mal-
practice, products liability, vicarious liability, and informed 
consent) and how they might function in the context of medical 
AI. In conclusion, this Article offers an analysis of how tort law 
may evolve in the future in response to the challenges created by 
medical AI today (e.g., legal evolutions that may take the form of 
new solutions like AI personhood, common enterprise liability, 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Artificial intelligence (AI)1 technology is increasingly used 
by a large percentage of the healthcare industry.2 AI in the med-
ical context is typically a type known as “machine learning,”3 a 
 
 1. Artificial Intelligence is also called augmented intelligence (or intelli-
gence augmentation), assisted intelligence, or autonomous intelligence. Some-
times the terms are used interchangeably, but there are distinctions. See Kath-
leen Walch, Is There a Difference Between Assisted Intelligence Vs. Augmented 
Intelligence?, FORBES (Jan. 12, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitive-
world/2020/01/12/is-there-a-difference-between-assisted-intelligence-vs-aug-
mented-intelligence. Walch notes the differences in types of artificial intelli-
gence as “a continuum of human-machine intelligence interaction ranging from 
situations where machines are basically repeating many of the tasks humans 
are already doing (assisted) to enabling humans to do more than they are cur-
rently capable of doing (augmented) to fully accomplishing tasks on their own 
without human intervention (autonomous).”Id. See also Aaron Masih, Aug-
mented Intelligence, Not Artificial Intelligence, Is the Future, MEDIUM (Jan. 19, 
2019), https://medium.com/datadriveninvestor/augmented-intelligence-not-ar-
tificial-intelligence-is-the-future-f07ada7d4815 (“While the underlying technol-
ogies powering AI [artificial intelligence] and IA [intelligence augmentation] 
are the same, the goals and applications are fundamentally different: AI aims 
to create systems that run without humans, whereas IA aims to create systems 
that make humans better. To be clear, this is not a separate category of tech-
nology, but simply a different way of thinking about its purpose.”). For purposes 
of this Article, I use the term artificial intelligence to refer generally to all types 
of AI, i.e., assisted, augmented, or autonomous. However, the term most often 
used in the medical context—and hence used in most of the examples discussed 
in this paper—is augmented intelligence, i.e., a technology assisting or enhanc-
ing a physician’s practice of medicine, rather than autonomous AI technology 
that takes over or supersedes a physician’s practice. 
 2. TATA CONSULTANCY SERVICES, GETTING SMARTER BY THE SECTOR: 
HOW 13 GLOBAL INDUSTRIES USE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 42 (Nov. 21, 2015), 
https://www.tcs.com/global-trend-studies (“Some 86% [of healthcare companies 
surveyed] are currently using cognitive technologies; of the 14% that don’t, all 
plan to do so by 2020.”); Bill Siwicki, 86% of Healthcare Companies Use Some 
Form of AI, HEALTHCARE IT NEWS (May 19, 2017), https://www.healthcareit-
news.com/news/86-healthcare-companies-use-some-form-ai (“About 86 percent 
of healthcare provider organizations, life science companies and technology ven-
dors are currently using artificial intelligence technology.”). 
 3. Michael E. Matheny et al., Artificial Intelligence in Health Care: The 
Hope, the Hype, the Promise, the Peril, in ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN HEALTH 
CARE: THE HOPE, THE HYPE, THE PROMISE, THE PERIL 15 (Michael Matheny, 
Sonoo Thadaney-Israni, Mahnoor Ahmed, & Danielle Whicher eds., 2019) (“Ma-
chine learning is a family of statistical and mathematical modeling techniques 
that uses a variety of approaches to automatically learn and improve the pre-
diction of a target state, without explicit programming (e.g., Boolean rules).”). 
Additionally, I will note that this book from the National Academy of Medicine 
is an excellent compendium regarding issues of AI in health care. 
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subset of AI where the technology uses algorithms to find pat-
terns in “vast amounts of data.”4 One such example of medical 
machine learning AI is that of Watson for Oncology (produced by 
IBM) which “uses cognitive computing to ‘interpret cancer pa-
tients’ clinical information and identify individualized, evidence-
based treatment options.’”5 How this works is that Watson is “fed 
reams of information on oncological matters” and then “scour[s] 
them to present doctors with treatment options, and recom-
mended drugs and instructions for administration.”6 The power 
of such machine learning is that the AI is able to go through vast 
amounts of data (more data than any one clinician can hope to 
scan and evaluate) and give relevant input to the physician in a 
very short period of time,7 all while simultaneously finding pat-
terns in the data that are impossible for humans to find or un-
derstand. 
The fundamental challenge of AI from a medical liability 
standpoint is assessing liability when some error and injury in-
evitably occurs. For example, what happens when an AI algo-
rithm recommends one course of action but a physician believes 
another course of action, based on their own substantial exper-
tise, is more prudent?8 What happens if the AI recommends a 
course of treatment and the physician adopts the recommenda-
tion, but the AI was wrong and the patient is injured? These 
questions are challenging because it is often impossible to un-
derstand how the AI made its decision; its reasoning is sealed off 
 
 4. W. Nicholson Price II, Artificial Intelligence in Health Care: Applica-
tions and Legal Implications, 14 SCITECH LAW. 10, 10 (2017) (“[D]ata come from 
many sources: electronic health records, medical literature, clinical trials, in-
surance claims data, pharmacy records, and even the data entered by patients 
into their smartphones or recorded on fitness trackers.”). 
 5. Jason Chung, What Should We Do About Artificial Intelligence in 
Health Care?, 22 HEALTH L. J. 37, 37 (2017). 
 6. Id. at 37 (“Watson does not seek answers to problems on its own but 
can draw upon disparate data sources to synthesize potential solutions.”). 
 7. Jason Chung & Amanda Zink, Hey Watson – Can I Sue You for Mal-
practice?– Examining the Liability of Artificial Intelligence in Medicine, 11 ASIA 
PAC. J. HEALTH L. & ETHICS 51, 57 (2018) (“[AI] can parse through unfathoma-
ble amounts of data, rank its quality, and integrate new information into its 
adaptive programming. It can do so at a rate no human can ever hope to 
match.”). 
 8. Danny Tobey & Allie Cohen, Medical Frontiers in AI Liability, 24 AHLA 
CONNECTIONS 22, 22 (Feb. 2020). Tobey and Cohen note the key question when 
a physician is confronted with such a conundrum: “Is the machine malfunction-
ing or is it seeing further?” Id. The answer to this question is often difficult 
(sometimes impossible) to know but is critical in understanding liability. 
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in the so-called “black-box.”9 If the reasoning of how an AI makes 
its determination cannot be understood, assigning liability may 
be near impossible under the traditional tort paradigms. For ex-
ample, how can a breach of duty be established if the reasoning 
of the AI is unknown? If the reasoning is unknowable, then it 
may be impossible to determine if the AI’s reasoning was sound 
or unsound with regard to a breach of tort duty. Additionally, 
when should a physician be duty bound to rely or not rely on an 
AI recommendation? The question is especially fraught when the 
physician cannot know the reasoning behind the recommenda-
tion. 
Also, the difficulty in analyzing liability is compounded by 
the fact that AI in the medical context is typically of the “aug-
mented” variety,10 meaning that it is more wholly integrated 
with the physician within the practice of medicine and ulti-
mately functions as a tool to help the physician treat patients.11 
The physician functions as an intermediary to the technology 
and hence still has a key role in the practice of medicine.12 How-
ever, AI also has a role, and the mixed nature of the AI’s role and 
the physician’s role can make establishing a legal duty or pars-
ing and assigning liability challenging. 
This Article aims to outline the aspects of medical negli-
gence (in the American jurisprudential context) most at issue 
and how they will be impacted by AI. Part II will discuss funda-
mental aspects about the nature of AI relevant to tort liability. 
 
 9. Price, supra note 4, at 10. Price notes that AI “algorithms themselves 
are often too complex for their reasoning to be understood or even stated explic-
itly. Such algorithms may be best described as a ‘black-box’”, i.e., the AI’s rea-
soning is completely sealed off from the creators and users of the technology. Id. 
 10. See supra text accompanying note 1 for a brief explanation of different 
types of AI. 
 11. Matheny et al., supra note 3, at 16. As noted in the National Academy 
of Medicine book about AI, “[c]ombining human intelligence and AI into aug-
mented intelligence focuses on a supportive or assistive role for the algorithms, 
emphasizing that these technologies are designed to enhance human pro-
cessing, cognition, and work, rather than replace it.” Id. 
 12. Chung & Zink, supra note 7, at 77–78. Authors note the difference be-
tween medical AI, like Watson for Oncology, and the AI of self-driving cars 
which function autonomously. Rather than being truly autonomous, medical AI 
of the augmented variety “relies on a human intermediary to interact with” and 
is detach[ed] from administering treatment based on its diagnoses, which 
means that “difficult moral and practical decisions involving patient care are 
left to human intermediaries [i.e., physicians and other clinicians].” Id. at 78. 
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Part III will discuss challenges current tort law paradigms have 
in the context of medical AI. Part IV will analyze how medical 
tort law may evolve in response to some of these key aspects of 
AI. Part V will conclude with a discussion of the possible evolu-
tion of medical tort law and what considerations may underlie 
which legal solutions will be chosen by society going forward. 
II. NATURE OF AI 
The nature of AI and how it is used in medicine is critical in 
understanding how it will impact tort law. This Part will exam-
ine two key characteristics of AI: opaqueness (i.e., the inherent 
lack of transparency and explainability of AI) and its develop-
ment and control (i.e., the quality of data used in its creation, 
the multiple parties and entities involved in the creation of AI, 
and those parties who also have dominion over its function, ex-
istence, and use). 
A. OPAQUENESS AND THE “BLACK-BOX” 
Most AI used in the medical context functions with a char-
acterization known as the “black-box.” Nicholson Price describes 
the “black-box” in the healthcare context—what he calls “black-
box medicine”—as the use of opaque computational models to 
make decisions related to healthcare.”13 He explains that “[a] de-
fining feature of black-box medicine is that those algorithms are 
non-transparent—that is, the relationships they capture cannot 
be explicitly understood, and sometimes cannot even be explic-
itly stated.”14 The phenomenon of the “black-box” is a product of 
machine learning known as “deep learning,” so-called from the 
machine’s vast “deep” neural network.15 The power of “deep” ma-
chine learning is becoming more and more evident. For example, 
 
 13. W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419, 
421 (2015) (emphasizing that “this type of medicine is ‘black-box’ to everyone by 
nature of its development; it is not ‘black-box’ because its workings are deliber-
ately hidden from view”). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Will Knight, The Dark Secret at the Heart of AI, MIT TECH. REV., (Apr. 
11, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/2017/04/11/5113/the-dark-secret-
at-the-heart-of-ai/. Knight provides an excellent synopsis on how AI’s “deep 
learning” works and how “by its nature” it is a “particularly dark black-box.” Id. 
As Knight explains, “[y]ou can’t just look inside a deep neural network to see 
how it works. A network’s reasoning is embedded in the behavior of thousands 
of simulated neurons, arranged into dozens or even hundreds of intricately in-
terconnected layers.” Id. 
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an AI known as Deep Patient was trained using data from about 
700,000 individuals, and when testing on new records, it proved 
incredibly good at predicting disease. Without any expert in-
struction, Deep Patient had discovered patterns hidden in the 
hospital data that seemed to indicate when people were on the 
way to a wide range of ailments, including cancer of the liver.16 
Additionally, opaqueness as a problem with AI goes beyond 
simple “black-box” opacity and hinges more broadly on the way 
AI is developed. Matthew Sherer explains how the research and 
development of AI can manifest itself in four ways (i.e., discreet-
ness, diffuseness, discreteness, and opacity) that impact the 
technology’s notable characteristic of lacking transparency and 
explainability: 
 
Discreetness refers to the fact that AI development work can be con-
ducted with limited visible infrastructure. Diffuseness means that the 
individuals working on a single component of an AI system might be 
located far away from one another. A closely related feature, discrete-
ness, refers to the fact that the separate components of an AI system 
could be designed in different places and at different times without any 
conscious coordination. Finally, opacity denotes the possibility that the 
inner workings of an AI system may be kept secret and may not be 
susceptible to reverse engineering.17 
 
Indeed, there is fear of the “black-box” and its opacity. Some 
clinicians may be wary about implementing this technology into 
their medical practice if doing so means relying on the AI’s judg-
ment without a full understanding of its reasoning. However, 
some argue that there is nothing truly to fear about AI’s opacity. 
Vijay Pande notes that the “black-box” is also endemic of human 
intelligence, in that “[h]uman intelligence can reason and make 
arguments for a given conclusion, but can’t explain the complex, 
underlying basis for how we arrived at a particular conclusion.”18 
 
 16. Id. Knight interviewed a clinician who had experience using Deep Pa-
tient. The clinician noted that, while he is impressed that the AI can success-
fully anticipate diseases and disorders, “we [still] don’t know how they [i.e., AI] 
work,” leading users to lack complete assurance in the technology’s accuracy. 
 17. Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligence Systems: Risks, 
Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 369 
(2016). 
 18. Vijay Pande, Artificial Intelligence’s ‘Black Box’ Is Nothing to Fear, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/25/opinion/artificial-
intelligence-black-box.html (“Perhaps that real source of the critics’ concerns 
isn’t that we can’t ‘see’ A.I.’s reasoning but that as A.I. gets more powerful, the 
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Indeed, it may just be the nature of intelligence—human or ar-
tificial—“that only a part of it is exposed to rational explana-
tion.”19 
B. DEVELOPMENT AND CONTROL 
The development and control of AI is another characteristic 
of the technology. A key aspect of AI, as it relates to medical tort 
law, is that who is in control of the technology and in control of 
how the technology is created (e.g., the quality of data inputted 
during development), may influence liability across a spectrum 
of different parties and additionally influence the effectiveness 
and proper functioning of AI when deployed.20 
For example, a fundamental aspect of AI is that it takes 
many different parties and entities to create it, e.g., many differ-
ent hardware and software developers. And as explained above, 
there is an element of diffuseness (i.e., developers working on AI 
might be located far away from each other and not working 
tightly in conjunction) and discreteness (i.e., different parts of 
the AI are created at different times and locations with poten-
tially no coordination).21 The diffuseness and discreteness in the 
development of AI make questions about assigning liability dif-
ficult, as issues of who “controls” the technology become difficult 
to parse, especially when also factoring in that the end-user of 
the AI (i.e., a hospital or physician) could also be a party who 
also potentially has control. Hence, answers related to agency 
and tort duties may be murky. 
Additionally, the quality of data used in the development of 
medical AI is also of profound concern as “bad data quality ad-
versely affects patient care and outcomes.”22 Experts note that 
 
human mind becomes the limiting factor . . . Doctors will no longer ‘drive’ the 
primary diagnosis; instead, they’ll ensure that the diagnosis is relevant and 
meaningful for a patient and oversee when and how to offer more clarification 
and more narrative explanation.”). 
 19. Knight, supra note 15 (“Some of it [i.e., intelligence] is just instinctual, 
or subconscious, or inscrutable.”). 
 20. See Sara Gerke, Timo Minssen & Glenn Cohen, Ethical and Legal Chal-
lenges of Artificial Intelligence-Driven Health Care, in ARTIFICIAL INTELLI-
GENCE IN HEALTHCARE 295, 313–14 (Bohr & Memarzadeh eds., 2020) (discuss-
ing the challenges AI-based technologies raise for medical tort liability 
regimes). 
 21. Scherer, supra note 17, at 369. 
 22. Hongfang Liu et al., AI Model Development and Validation, in ARTIFI-
CIAL INTELLIGENCE IN HEALTH CARE: THE HOPE, THE HYPE, THE PROMISE, THE 
2021] WHO WILL BE LIABLE  9 
 
while it is “widely accepted that the successful development of 
an AI system requires high-quality data,” a significant problem 
exists because the means to assess “the quality of data that are 
available and the methodology to create a high-quality dataset 
are not standardized or often are nonexistent.”23 Another nota-
ble problem regarding the data sets used by AI is that they may 
not be properly representative of the population the AI is ulti-
mately used on, leading to poor outcomes.24 In the United States, 
for example, while there exist some datasets that are adequately 
representative of the population, “in many instances AI is being 
developed with data that is not population-representative.”25 
Matheny et al. note that “AI should be trained and validated on 
population-representative data to ensure accuracy for all popu-
lations and to achieve performance levels necessary for scalable 
success.”26 Experts conclude that in order to “effectively use AI, 
it is essential to follow good data practices in both the creation 
and curation of retrospective datasets for model training and in 
the prospective collection of the data.”27 
The problem regarding data is different from the problem 
regarding opacity, as it not necessarily inherent in the nature of 
machine learning AI (like opacity). It is instead driven by devel-
 
PERIL 136 (Michael Matheny, Sonoo Thadaney-Israni, Mahnoor Ahmed, & Dan-
ielle Whicher eds., 2019); see also id. at 133 (“Developing AI based on bad data 
further amplifies the potential negative impacts of poor-quality data. Consider, 
for example, that race and ethnicity information is simply not recorded, is miss-
ing, or is wrong in more than 30 to 40 percent of the records at most medical 
centers.”). 
 23. Id. at 133. 
 24. Michael E. Matheny et al., Artificial Intelligence in Health Care: Hope 
Not Hype, Promise Not Peril, in ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN HEALTH CARE: 
THE HOPE, THE HYPE, THE PROMISE, THE PERIL 214, 218 (Michael Matheny, 
Sonoo Thadaney Israni, Mahnoor Ahmed & Danielle Whicher eds., 2019). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Michael E. Matheny et al., Artificial Intelligence in Health Care: A Re-
port From the National Academy of Medicine, 323 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 509, 509 
(2020) (“[T]here continue to be issues of data quality, appropriate consent, in-
teroperability, and scale of data transfers. The current challenges [regarding 
population-representative data] are grounded in patient and health care system 
preferences, and political will rather than technical capacity or specifications. 
It is prudent to engage AI developers, users, and patients and their families in 
discussion about appropriate policy, regulatory, and legislative solutions.”). 
 27. Liu et al., supra note 22, at 133. The authors additionally note that 
“[t]he quality of these data practices affects the development of models and the 
successful implementation at the point of care.” Id. 
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opers and users who either do not develop the technology ade-
quately (e.g., feeding the AI with poor quality data) or use AI 
improperly (e.g., using AI developed with poor data or using AI 
on an unrepresentative population). If the AI is not using quality 
or relevant data, it will not operate as ideally intended and, if its 
results are relied upon by clinicians, poor or disastrous outcomes 
will likely follow. The solution to the data problem requires co-
ordination of several stakeholders, including developers, govern-
ment regulators, and end-users (i.e., physicians and other clini-
cians) of the technology. 
III. CHALLENGES IN APPLYING AI TO TORT LAW 
Difficulties will undoubtedly arise when cases unfold where 
the AI is alleged to have caused harm. Considering the nature of 
AI, complicated questions emerge when trying to ask courts “to 
unravel novel technology and apply ill-fitting case law to make 
determinations of liability” when traditional tort paradigms ap-
plicable to humans may not easily apply to AI.28 Note that the 
legal challenges (and possible legal solutions) go beyond mere 
tort law. The legal impact of AI in the medical context is wide in 
scope and relevant to numerous legal spheres, such as intellec-
tual property and privacy.29 Additionally, it should be noted that 
while tort law is primarily governed by state common law, regu-
latory law can have strong influence over torts.30 However, this 
 
 28. Artificial Intelligence Litigation: Can the Law Keep Pace With the Rise 
of the Machines?, QUINN EMANUEL: BUSINESS LITIGATION REPORTS 
https://www.quinnemanuel.com/the-firm/publications/article-december-2016-
artificial-intelligence-litigation-can-the-law-keep-pace-with-the-rise-of-the-ma-
chines/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2020). 
 29. See generally Price, supra note 4 (noting that several areas of law be-
sides tort are relevant to AI in healthcare, including regulation (e.g., how the 
FDA will regulate AI algorithms), intellectual property (e.g., protection of algo-
rithms via patent law and/or trade secrecy), and privacy (e.g., adherence to pri-
vacy laws like HIPAA)). See also, I. Glenn Cohen & Michelle M. Mello, Big Data, 
Big Tech, and Protecting Patient Privacy, 322 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1141 (2019) 
(discussing privacy concerns related to AI and arguing that HIPAA is outdated 
and needs to be modernized to address concerns of data sharing and privacy in 
the 21st century). 
 30. Douglas McNair & W. Nicholson Price II, Health Care AI: Law, Regu-
lation, and Policy, in ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN HEALTH CARE: THE HOPE, 
THE HYPE, THE PROMISE, THE PERIL 181, 200 (Michael Matheny, Sonoo 
Thadaney Israni, Mahnoor Ahmed & Danielle Whicher eds., 2019) (“Different 
regulatory pathways influence the availability of state tort lawsuits against AI 
developers and, indirectly, the ability of state tort law (and liability insurers 
reacting to that law) to create independent incentives for the safe and effective 
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Article will primarily focus on the impact of medically-related 
American31 tort law in the realm of traditional negligence, with-
out examining in detail the regulatory complications in a tort 
analysis. 
A. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (NEGLIGENCE) 
Applying tort law (i.e., claims of negligence or medical mal-
practice32) to AI is challenging in that “[c]ourts have tradition-
ally deemed it impossible for machines to have legal liability as 
they are not legal persons.”33 Hence, absent a model AI person-
hood (discussed later in this Article), the possible defendants in 
an AI malpractice case are the AI developers and manufacturers 
or the users of the AI (i.e., hospital, physicians, or other clini-
cians). However, parsing who is liable—either by determining 
causation, existence of duty, or breach of the standard of care34—
may be difficult in the context of medical AI. 
To satisfy a claim of malpractice, the plaintiff must demon-
strate that the physician’s breach is the “proximate cause” of the 
plaintiff’s injury.35 Yavar Bathaee explains that: 
 
development of clinical AI systems. In general, states may not establish statu-
tory requirements that are ‘different from, or in addition to,’ FDA requirements 
regulating devices (21 U.S.C. § 360k). The U.S. Supreme Court has also held 
that this preempts certain state tort lawsuits alleging negligent design or man-
ufacturing.”). 
 31. While the focus of this Article is on the tort law in the American context, 
if one has interest in delving deeper into other jurisdictions globally, the Euro-
pean Commission published an excellent report examining this issue from the 
context of European tort law. See LIABILITY FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND 
OTHER EMERGING DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES, EXPERT GROUP ON LIABILITY AND 
NEW TECHNOLOGIES – NEW TECHNOLOGIES FORMATION, DS-03-19-853-EN-N 
(2019). 
 32. Hannah R. Sullivan & Scott J. Schweikart, Are Current Tort Liability 
Doctrines Adequate for Addressing Injury Caused by AI?, 21 AMA J. ETHICS, 
160, 161 (2019) (“Typical tort claims in the realm of medicine and health include 
medical malpractice (negligence), respondeat superior (vicarious liability) and 
products liability.”). 
 33. Chung & Zink, supra note 7, at 51. 
 34. B. Sonny Bal, An Introduction to Medical Malpractice in the United 
States, 469 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS AND RELATED RES. 339, 342 (2009) (stating 
that the elements of medical malpractice are “(1) the existence of a legal duty 
on the part of the doctor to provide care or treatment to the patient; (2) a breach 
of this duty by a failure of the treating doc-tor to adhere to the standards of the 
profession; (3) a causal relationship between such breach of duty and injury to 
the patient; and (4) the existence of damages that flow from the injury such that 
the legal system can provide redress”). 
 35. Id. 
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Fundamentally, proximate cause asks whether the result of the con-
duct was one that could have been foreseen by a reasonable person. At 
its core is the assumption that a person should not be liable for results 
having nothing to do with what he could have done to limit the risk of 
harm, nor should there be liability for the flukes of chance.36 
 
However, in the context of “black-box” AI, “the result of the 
AI’s decision or conduct may not have been in any way foreseea-
ble by the AI’s creator or user.”37 With an inability to establish 
causation, it can become exceedingly difficult to successfully as-
sign liability in context of medical AI. Danny Tobey further notes 
that “[c]ausation and fault are increasingly opaque too, because 
of the number of human and machine interactions along the 
spectrum of AI usage.”38 
Sometimes, when causation may be difficult to prove, negli-
gence claims may be resolved by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, 
a method where the common law has allowed negligence to be 
inferred to a particular defendant “when the accident causing 
the plaintiff’s physical harm is a type of accident that ordinarily 
happens because of the negligence of the class of actors of which 
the defendant is the relevant member.”39 In the context of AI’s 
issues with opacity and explainability, res ipsa loquitur may be 
a possible solution in establishing liability, though issues re-
main. As Brandon Jackson notes, “[i]f the harm in question is 
unexplainable, untraceable, and rare, then the elements of res 
 
 36. Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial Intelligence Black Box and the Failure of 
Intent and Causation, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 889, 923 (2018). 
 37. Id. at 924 (“Put simply, if even the creator of the AI cannot necessarily 
foresee how the AI will make decisions, what conduct it will engage in, or the 
nature of the patterns it will find in data, what can be said about the reasonable 
person in such a situation?”). 
 38. Danny Tobey, Explainability: Where AI and Liability Meet, DLA PIPER 
(Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publica-
tions/2019/02/explainability-where-ai-and-liability-meet/. Tobey gives a “real-
life” example of the opaqueness problem the context of AI used in the legal pro-
fession: “a judge’s reliance on a bail-setting algorithm.” Id. “The algorithm sug-
gested the risk of releasing the defendant back into society was low. The judg-
ment followed the machine’s recommendation, only for the defendant to commit 
murder upon release.” Id. After such a tragedy and assuming negligence oc-
curred, without an understanding of how the AI made its recommendation, it is 
not clear how to establish causation or attribute fault. 
 39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMO-
TIONAL HARM § 17 (Am. Law. Inst. 2010). 
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ipsa loquitur likely cannot be satisfied.” 40 Additionally, courts 
using res ipsa loquitur, when making a negligence analysis, infer 
that the party with exclusive control over the instrumentality 
that inflicts harm, is in all likelihood, negligent.41 This “exclu-
sive-control criterion is often effective in identifying the negli-
gent party.”42 Hence, in the AI context, res ipsa loquitur may not 
be able to address all negligence uncertainties, because as pre-
viously discussed, AI systems often have a slew of developers 
and no one entity may have clear “control” over the “instrumen-
tality” (i.e., the AI) that causes that patient’s injury. 
Another key factor when considering medical malpractice in 
the face of AI, is how the standard of care changes in the liability 
analysis.43 The standard of care is a factor in the “breach” ele-
ment of negligence and medical malpractice. A physician’s devi-
ation from the standard of care will amount to a breach in their 
duty to the patient.44 Typically, a court evaluates this standard 
“by reference of what a reasonable physician would have done—
i.e., a person with the same kind of technical background, train-
ing, and expertise as the defendant.”45 But when a new technol-
ogy, such as a medical device or AI, is introduced into practice, 
“the standard of care can be ambiguous as applied to the adop-
tion by a physician of a new medical device.”46 Hence, in this era 
 
 40. Brandon W. Jackson, Artificial Intelligence and the Fog of Innovation: 
A Deep-Dive on Governance and the Liability of Autonomous Systems, 35 SANTA 
CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 59 (2019). 
 41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMO-
TIONAL HARM § 17 cmt. b (Am. Law. Inst. 2010). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Tobey & Cohen, supra note 8, at 22. (“[S]oon, with AI raising the achiev-
able standards of care for patients, failure to adopt [an AI’s recommendation] 
may provide new sources of liability.”). Hence, those physicians who fail to adopt 
an AI’s determination may in fact become liable themselves, as the standard of 
care has shifted to include the AI. 
 44. Michael D. Greenberg, Medical Malpractice and New Devices: Defining 
an Elusive Standard of Care, 19 HEALTH MATRIX J. 423, 427 (2009) (“Establish-
ing a whether a breach has taken place requires a comparison between the phy-
sician’s actions and a legal ‘standard of care’, which represents what physicians 
are obligated by law to do in providing medical services to their patients.”). 
 45. Id. at 428 (“Traditionally, the law has been very deferential to physician 
custom in determining what qualifies as malpractice. In other words, whatever 
constituted usual or typical medical care in a region was often formally defined 
as reasonable conduct, and where a physician’s treatment comported with pro-
fessional custom, this was sufficient to avoid any breach in the duty of care.”). 
 46. Id. at 434. 
14 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 22:2 
 
of newly deployed AI, physicians are left with some degree of un-
certainty (at least early on) about how and if they should be us-
ing AI, so as to properly align with the standard of care.47 
B. PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY 
DOCTRINE 
Products liability is a common law doctrine that allows pa-
tients to be “entitled to recovery when they are injured by prod-
ucts that are ‘not reasonably safe’ due to defective design, man-
ufacture, or warning.”48 With regard to medical devices (and 
there are arguments for and against AI being classified as a med-
ical device for products liability purposes49), the common law 
states that “[a] manufacturer of a prescription drug or medical 
device who sells or otherwise distributes a defective . . . device is 
subject to liability for harm to persons caused by the defect.”50 
While products liability is straightforward, it may be compli-
cated when applied to AI since, as discussed, AI may have mul-
tiple developers, and who may be deemed the manufacturer in 
some instances could be unclear. Likewise, the nature of opacity 
and the “black-box” may make it impossible in some instances to 
determine that an AI was actually a “defective” product. 
An additional wrinkle in products liability is that of the 
learned intermediary doctrine. The doctrine has “potential to 
protect an AI’s manufacturer from failure-to-warn claims for 
 
 47. W. Nicholson Price II, Medical Malpractice and Black-Box Medicine, in 
BIG DATA, HEALTH LAW, & BIOETHICS 295, 303 (I. Glenn Cohen, Holly Fernan-
dez Lynch, Effy Vayena, Urs Gasser, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2018) (“Pro-
viders will typically be held to the level of care of other comparable providers, 
which will develop over time as black-box medicine enters care.”). 
 48. Sullivan & Schweikart, supra note 32, at 162. 
 49. Jessica S. Allain, From Jeopardy to Jaundice: The Medical Liability Im-
plications of Dr. Watson and Other Artificial Intelligence Systems, 73 LA. L. REV. 
1049, 1072 (comparing AI systems to “a textbook or the Internet, which are 
clearly outside the scope of medical device regulation,” but explaining that such 
systems “make a clear impact on patients through [their] diagnosis and treat-
ment recommendations,” which weighs in favor of including AI as a medical 
device). 
 50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6(a) (1998); see also id. 
§ 6(c) (“A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to de-
fective design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or medical de-
vice are sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits that 
reasonable health-care providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks and thera-
peutic benefits, would not prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of 
patients.”). 
2021] WHO WILL BE LIABLE  15 
 
risks they have disclosed to intermediaries.”51 The doctrine func-
tions this way: 
 
The learned intermediary doctrine prevents plaintiffs from suing med-
ical device manufacturers directly. Manufacturers have the duty to 
warn consumers of potential dangers inherent in a product’s natural 
use. In the case of medical devices [and hence, some AIs if applicable] 
manufacturers have a duty to warn the treating physician of the prod-
uct’s potential dangers. The physician becomes a learned intermediary 
between the manufacturer and the patient, eliminating any duty the 
manufacturer may have had directly to the patient.52 
 
Also concerning from the standpoint of medical AI is that in 
the growing age of telemedicine,53 the learned intermediary doc-
trine loses some of its initial purpose in allowing the physician 
to function as the protective “barrier” to the patient, as physi-
cians are more removed and their warning may have less im-
pact.54 
C. VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
Vicarious liability is another aspect of tort law that must be 
considered when confronting medical AI. It is a tort “regime 
whereby one individual can be held legally responsible for the 
acts of another.”55 In the employment context under a theory of 
agency, “the doctrine of respondeat superior places vicarious lia-
bility on employers for the negligent acts of employees acting 
 
 51. Tobey & Cohen, supra note 8, at 22. 
 52. Allain, supra note 49, at 1068–69. 
 53. Telemedicine use has been dramatically growing in recent years. See 
Telehealth Up 53%, Growing Faster Than Any Other Place of Care, AMA (May 
29, 2019), https://www.ama-assn.org/practice-management/digital/telehealth-
53-growing-faster-any-other-place-care. Additionally, in light of the COVID-19 
pandemic, the frequency of telemedicine is further increasing in addition to the 
already established growing trend. See Jedrek Wosik et al., Telehealth Trans-
formation: COVID-19 and the Rise of Virtual Care, 27 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS 
ASS’N 957, 959 (2020). 
 54. Tobey & Cohen, supra note 8, at 24 (“[W]hen physicians don’t interact 
with patients until after the prescription has been written, and then only 
through online messaging, physician warnings start to resemble labels, and the 
barrier of the ‘intermediary’ thins.”). 
 55. Allain, supra note 49, at 1064–65. Allain notes that this “is most com-
monly found in the employer-employee relationship in which an employer can 
be held liable for the employee’s tortious conduct.” Id.; see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB., § 13 (2000). 
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within the scope of their employment.”56 In the medical context, 
vicarious liability or respondeat superior is possible as “hospitals 
can be held vicariously liable for the acts of their employees, in-
cluding physicians, who commit malpractice.”57 In the context of 
AI, a question emerges whether or not an AI could be deemed an 
“agent” or “employee” of a hospital into order to impute liability 
to the “principal,” in this case a hospital.58 Answering this ques-
tions is challenging, as respondeat superior is founded on agency 
theory, premised by the idea that the principal (e.g., a hospital) 
has some control or power over the agent (e.g., an employee—
normally a physician, but potentially also an AI system).59 Con-
trol is the key to analysis, as an agency relationship is required 
for vicarious liability to attach and the concept of “control” be-
tween the parties, i.e., one party having supervisory power over 
another, is key to establishing the agency relationship. The dif-
ficulty with AI is its ever-growing autonomous nature. As Mark 
Chinen notes, “[t]he less sophisticated a machine is [as opposed 
to one that is fully autonomous], the more appropriate it is to 
focus on the individual human or group of humans who used it, 
and any harm caused by such a tool is readily attributable to its 
users.”60 If a court deems an AI to be fully autonomous (or, if not 
autonomous, maybe held to be under the dominion of its design-
ers rather than the hospital who purchased and uses it), then 
holding a hospital vicariously liable for any injury caused by AI 
will be impossible, as such an autonomous AI will functionally 
be outside of the principal’s control. 
D. INFORMED CONSENT LIABILITY 
While much of the discussion is focused on AI impacting tra-
ditional medical negligence, it may also impact informed consent 
 
 56. Sullivan & Schweikart, supra note 32, at 161–62. 
 57. Allain, supra note 49, at 1065. 
 58. Id. at 1066 (“Just as hospitals may be vicariously liable for a physician’s 
negligence, courts could likewise hold a hospital vicariously liable for injuries 
caused by its artificial intelligence systems.”). 
 59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB., § 13 cmt. 
a (2000). 
 60. Mark A. Chinen, The Co-Evolution of Autonomous Machines and Legal 
Responsibility, 20 VA. J.L. & TECH. 338, 360–61 (2016) (noting that “it can be 
argued that the sophistication of a machine does impact legal liability and 
stretches current conceptions of that liability. Put in terms of agency law, a 
completely autonomous machine would be capable of engaging in the frolic and 
detour” outside of the scope of the agency relationship.). 
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claims. Informed consent causes of action are a species of medi-
cal negligence that grew out of an emphasis on patient auton-
omy.61 Nadia Sawicki explains that “[i]n defining the scope of the 
informed consent duty, courts uniformly concluded that physi-
cians have a legal obligation to inform patients of material infor-
mation [i.e., risks, benefits, and alternatives] about a proposed 
course of treatment.”62 Tobey and Cohen note that in the context 
of medical AI, “treatment plans may be presented in absolutes 
without a discussion of options or pros and cons,”63 thus reinforc-
ing the physician’s role to ensure that adequate information is 
imparted to the patient in order to make an informed decision. 
Price also recognizes the problem of informed consent in the con-
text of AI, noting that “[b]lack-box medicine raises nuanced in-
formed-consent issues. At an intuitive level, it is hard to imagine 
precisely what ‘informed’ means in the context of a recommen-
dation where no-one knows exactly how it works.”64 Looking 
broadly at the landscape of informed consent cases, Glenn Cohen 
outlines three types of cases that may be relevant to medical AI: 
provider experience (e.g., a scenario where a physician fails to 
disclose use of AI during the informed consent process in an ef-
fort to hide inexperience),65 substitute physicians (e.g., a sce-
nario where the patient may be “unaware of the role of AI/ML 
[artificial intelligence/machine-learning] in only a particular 
 
 61. Nadia N. Sawicki, Modernizing Informed Consent: Expanding the 
Boundaries of Materiality, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 821, 822–23 (2016) (noting that 
“[i]t was not until the early 1960s that most medical and legal professionals 
began to recognize that malpractice liability could attach to a physician’s failure 
to properly inform her patient of the risks and benefits of proposed clinical treat-
ment”). 
 62. Id. at 827. 
 63. Tobey & Cohen, supra note 8, at 24. 
 64. Price II, supra note 47, at 299 n.15; see also Gerke et al., supra note 20, 
at 301. The notion is also reflected by Gerke, Minssen and Cohen, when they 
ask: “[t]o what extent, for example, does a clinician need to disclose that they 
cannot fully interpret the diagnosis/treatment recommendations by the AI? 
How much transparency is needed?” Id. 
 65. I. Glenn Cohen, Informed Consent and Medical Artificial Intelligence: 
What to Tell the Patient?, 108 GEO. L.J. 1425, 1435–36 (2020). Cohen hypothe-
sizes about a possible case where “failure to disclose AI/ML [artificial intelli-
gence/machine-learning] involvement in decisionmaking or actual procedures, 
especially when AI/ML is meant to enable a regular doctor to perform at the 
level of a specialist, goes to the lack of experience/qualification of a doctor that 
ought to be disclosed.” Id. 
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part of their treatment”),66 and financial conflicts of interest 
(e.g., a scenario where a physician fails to disclose a financial 
interest in the AI used in the patient’s treatment).67 
IV. HOW TORT LAW MAY EVOLVE 
While it is early and the law is unfolding68, undoubtedly tort 
law will evolve over the coming decades to adapt to the problems 
created by the nature and characteristics of AI outlined above. 
These legal “evolutions” can be thought of as legal solutions to 
the problems created by AI used in the medical context. When 
considering legal solutions, it is important to understand what 
the biggest problems raised by AI are. Gerke et al. explain that 
how AI-driven problems are prioritized will ultimately shape the 
legal policy solutions: 
 
Setting the optimal liability regime depends heavily on what one 
thinks the “problem” is. If one is concerned that the deployment of AI-
based technology in the clinical space is associated with a high risk for 
patients to get hurt, one might want to keep the current medical mal-
practice regime that attempts to meet both tort law’s two functions: (1) 
deterrence and (2) compensation of the victims. By contrast, if one be-
lieves that over the run of cases, reliance on AI promotes patient 
health, then it may be a problem if physicians prove reluctant to rely 
on these algorithms, especially the more opaque ones, when they re-
main on the hook for resulting liability . . . This might drive the policy-
maker to a different model.69 
 
In light of this, three possible ways the law could evolve and 
adapt in an attempt to find solutions include: AI personhood, 
common enterprise liability, and a modification of the standard 
of care.70 
 
 66. Id. at 1436–39 (“For example, the physician performs the surgery her-
self, but it is based on an AI/ML [artificial intelligence/machine-learning] rec-
ommendation of which surgical technique to use in this specific case.”). 
 67. Id. at 1439. 
 68. W. Nicholson Price II, Medical AI and Contextual Bias, 33 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 65, 86 (2019) (“The tort landscape for medical AI is largely theoretical, 
as the technology is just entering practice.”). 
 69. Gerke et al., supra note 20, at 313–14. 
 70. In 2019, Hannah Sullivan and I outlined these possible legal solutions. 
I will expound upon these further in this Part. See, Sullivan & Schweikart, su-
pra note 32, at 163–64. 
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A. AI PERSONHOOD 
Traditionally, courts have not viewed it as possible to hold a 
machine or computer (like AI) legally responsible, as they are 
“not legal persons.”71 Chung argues that, by way of analogy com-
paring AI to medical students, “there is enough overlap between 
the two [i.e., AI and medical students] in terms of level of au-
thority, tasks and level of oversight for the court to make such a 
determination [i.e. a determination of personhood status for 
AI].”72 David Vladeck notes that “[c]onferring ‘personhood’ on 
these machines would resolve the agency question; the machines 
would become principals in their own right, and along with new 
legal status would come new legal burdens, including the burden 
of self-insurance.”73 Of course, if we look to the personhood solu-
tion for AI, Vladeck points out that it is likely that the standard 
of care applied to AI and that applied to humans would be dif-
ferent, and autonomous machines would then have a standard 
of care unique to themselves.74 Additionally, Chinen notes that 
conferring “personhood” on AI may not be such a far leap, as 
“giving legal personhood to things is not new. Ships and corpo-
rations enjoy status as legal persons and assume liabilities.” 75 
B. COMMON ENTERPRISE LIABILITY 
As discussed earlier, a key problem with AI technology is 
that there are many different developers involved in its creation. 
Scherer notes that to some extent, tort law already has a method 
to apportion liability, explaining that “[t]he discreteness of AI is 
 
 71. Chung & Zink, supra note 7, at 51. 
 72. Chung, supra note 5, at 39. 
 73. David. C. Vladeck, Machines Without Principles: Liability Rules and 
Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 117, 150 (2014); see also Allain, supra 
note 49, at 1079 (explaining that such self-insurance could be “a mandatory 
malpractice insurance policy” that is paid for by the AI’s owner). 
 74. Vladeck, supra note 73, at 130, 132. (“[T]he court in the first driver-less 
car case [using driver-care technology as the example AI] will likely ask whether 
the car involved in the accident performed up to the standards achievable by 
the majority of the other driver-less cars, as well as the performance specifica-
tion set by the car’s manufacturer.”). 
 75. Chinen, supra note 60, at 387–88 (noting that conferring personhood on 
AI may also come with a “combination of pragmatic and ethical quandaries,” 
such as “whether machines should be granted legal rights in addition to du-
ties.”). 
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also shared by many other modern and non-so-modern technol-
ogies.”76 American jurisprudence already has a body of common 
law regarding tort apportionment of liability,77 and this may 
work to solve some issues. However, because of the nature of 
some AI and the intricate aspect of its development between 
multiple parties, being able to apportion liability under tradi-
tional scenarios may not always be possible. 
Vladeck explains that one could, in theory, apply a strict li-
ability model that would simply function to hold only the manu-
facturer or developer of an AI automatically liable.78 However 
such a model is not ideal79 as there are other companies and en-
tities that help produce the final complex product, not simply the 
main manufacturer.80 As a solution, Vladeck proposes “common 
enterprise” liability,81 where “each entity within a set of interre-
lated companies may be held jointly and severally liable for the 
actions of other entities that are part of the group.”82 This theory 
of liability is advantageous when applied to AI, as it “would not 
require that the companies function jointly; all that would be re-
quired is that they work to a common end—to design, program, 
and manufacture” an AI product and “its various component 
parts.”83 As Vladeck further explains, common enterprise liabil-
ity “permits the law to impose joint liability without having to 
 
 76. Scherer, supra note 17, at 374 (noting an example with regards to au-
tomobile technology, explaining that “[a]utomobiles have long been manufac-
tured using components from multiple companies and courts long ago developed 
rules for apportioning liability when harm is caused by defects in multiple such 
components.”). 
 77. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY §§ 
10–17 (Am. L. Inst. 2013). 
 78. See Vladeck, supra note 73, at 146 (“My proposal is to construct a sys-
tem of strict liability, completely uncoupled from notions of fault for this select 
group of cases.”). 
 79. See Bathaee, supra note 36, at 894. While not explored in great detail 
in this article, strict liability could be another potential solution. However, as 
Bathaee points out, it is “a poor solution for the problem because if one cannot 
foresee the solutions an AI may reach or the effects it may have, one also cannot 
engage in conduct that strict liability is designed to incentivize, such as taking 
necessary precautions or calibrating the level of financial risk one is willing to 
tolerate.” Id. 
 80. See Vladeck, supra note 73, at 148 (“From a cost-spreading standpoint, 
it is far from clear that the manufacturer should absorb the costs when parts 
and computer code supplied by other companies may be the root cause.”). 
 81. Id. at 149. 
 82. FTC v. Tax Club, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 2d 461, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 83. Vladeck, supra note 73, at 149. 
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lay bare and grapple with the details of assigning every aspect 
of wrongdoing to one party or another; it is enough that in pur-
suit of a common aim the parties in engaged in wrongdoing.”84 
C. NEW STANDARD OF CARE 
Possibly the most natural solution is to have common-law 
medical malpractice modify its standard of care over time for 
physicians to reflect the newfound reality of medical AI in clini-
cal practice. Price argues that the standard will likely “develop[] 
organically,” but that it also could be created via a professional 
organization as a practice guideline.85 Such a guideline might 
suggest a standard of care that is responsive to the level of risk, 
where a physician may have to seek greater validation or inquiry 
before accepting an AI’s determination if the risk and conse-
quences are high.86 Greenberg also echoes this notion of valida-
tion, explaining that when a physician is exposed to new medical 
device, the standard of care may require a physician to take ex-
tra steps to learn as much as possible, e.g., “by reading all of the 
clinical trial information on the risks and benefits of a new de-
vice, following any pertinent label instructions, and seeking rel-
evant training where appropriate.”87 And considering the issues 
some AI have with being developed with improper data, physi-
cians need to do their research and learn how an AI was devel-
oped, what risks may exist in its use, and if its use is appropriate 
for the physician’s patient population. Just like with any other 
novel medical device a physician learned to use, the standard of 
 
 84. Id. at 149 (noting that rather than there being a wrongdoer, there is 
instead “an inference of liability drawn by operation of law to protect a blame-
less party [e.g. in the medical AI context, an injured patient] . . . ”). 
 85. See W. Nicholson Price II, Medical Malpractice and Black-Box Medicine 
9 (U. Mich. L. Sch., Working Paper No. 536, 2017) (“While the standard typically 
develops organically through the practice of providers (while cyclically shaping 
those practices), the standard can also be influenced by legislative action, judi-
cial standard-setting, or practice guidelines set by professional organizations.”). 
 86. Id. at 9. (“For minimal-risk interventions, such as otherwise un-indi-
cated testing, increased monitoring, or taking widely used low-side-effect drugs 
like aspirin, the standard of care might require no particular inquiry of the rec-
ommendations of a black-box algorithm. For riskier interventions, such as tak-
ing higher doses of a powerful drug—or avoiding such a course when otherwise 
suggested—providers might require some validation before relying on a black-
box algorithm.”). 
 87. Greenberg, supra note 44, at 444. 
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care will undoubtedly shift to require a physician to perform due 
diligence88 in any AI they use. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Looking to the future, some mix of the three possibilities 
outlined above—AI personhood, common enterprise liability, 
and a new standard of care—is likely to be implemented. All of 
the solutions serve a common goal: to allow the injured party to 
have some course of redress. If tort law does not adapt to the 
reality of medical AI and the problems it creates (e.g., notably, 
opacity and explainability), many claims will simply not be via-
ble as causation will be impossible to demonstrate. What the ex-
act landscape of tort law will look like in the future will depend 
on what aspects of the problems associated with AI society pri-
oritizes.89 If injured patients are the societal priority, then solu-
tions that allow them to become whole will incorporate liability 
paradigms that will allow for the developers or physicians to be 
liable. Assuming that society’s priority is to protect injured pa-
tients first, the next battle will be waged between AI developers 
and physicians over who should shoulder more of the liability 
regarding AI used in medical practice. For example, the solu-
tions of AI personhood and common enterprise liability put most 
of the liability and risk towards the developers, while a shift in 
the standard of care can allow for the physicians (as end users of 
the technology) to have liability in certain scenarios. How this 
potential tension between AI developers and physicians plays 
out, and how medical tort law continues to develop in the future 




 88. See Price II, supra note 85, at 14 (“Providers and facilities should eval-
uate black-box algorithms for hallmarks of careful development, including in-
dependent validation of algorithmic results and the qualifications of the devel-
opers.”). 
 89. See Gerke et al., supra note 20, 313–14 (reiterating that what society 
prioritizes in terms of the problem of AI and liability will ultimately shape the 
legal solutions). 
